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1. The Deceiving God and the Free Creation of Eternal Truths
The following well-known passage from Descartes’ First Meditation
introduces the concept of metaphysical doubt:
And yet firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion that
there is an omnipotent God who made me the kind of creature that
I am. How do I know that he has not brought it about that there is
no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place,
while at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me
to exist just as they do now? What is more, since I sometimes
believe that others go astray in cases where they think they have
the most perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every
time I add two and three or count the sides of a square, or in some
even simpler matter, if that is imaginable?1
The entire Meditations on First Philosophy is dedicated to demolishing
this doubt, which presents the largest threat to scientific authority.
Descartes refers to metaphysical doubt in order to bring into question
the truth of simple propositions of mathematics. However, what does it
mean for Descartes to suggest that I could deceive myself “every time I
add two and three,” given that it is inconceivable for me that two added
to three is not five?
Interpreters often explain doubts concerning mathematical proposi-
tions and, more generally, sentences the negation of which imply a clear
contradiction2by referring to the Cartesian doctrine of the free creation of
eternal truths. According to this doctrine, God could have established
true propositions that were clearly contradictory.3 On this view, God
could have made the human mind capable of conceiving that God could
have established that two added to three is not five, while at the same
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time making it inconceivable that two added to three is anything but
five—a condition that seems to perfectly fit the idea of doubting the
truth of a proposition whose opposite is inconceivable. This condition
provides additional grounds for citing the doctrine of the free creation
of eternal truths as an explanation for the hyperbolic doubt of the First
Meditation. In fact, it offers a clear interpretive key for distinguishing a
psychological inability to doubt from a metaphysical inability to doubt:
even when it is impossible to conceive of the opposite of a proposition,
God could have established its falsity. An explanation for the possibility
of hyperbolic doubt made through an appeal to the doctrine of the free
creation of eternal truths, which would maintain that anything can be
doubted—even things that look evident when actually inspected—, is
thus particularly well suited for interpretations that refute any inter-
section between psychological and metaphysical doubt.4
One should admit that from the outset of the deceiving God hypothe-
sis, there are compelling grounds to introduce God as a free creator of
eternal truths. In fact, the Cartesian doctrine of the free creation of eter-
nal truths claims that God has absolute power in the constitution of truth
and, particularly, in the establishment of those truths whose opposites
imply their own contradiction. The recurrent, if not exclusively Cartesian
example of this kind of proposition consists in mathematical truths: in a
celebrated letter to Marin Mersenne, dated April 15, 1630, Descartes first
articulates the doctrine, stating that “mathematical truths . . . have been
laid down by God and depend on him entirely no less than the rest of his
creatures” (CSMK 23; AT I 145). In a following letter to Mersenne, dated
May 6, 1630, Descartes reaffirms the doctrine’s relationship to “mathe-
matical truths” (CSMK 25; AT I 150), and then, in a letter dated May 27,
1630, Descartes adapts the first example of these truths from Thomas
Aquinas (CSMK 25; AT I 152). Addressing the issue of geometrical truth,
Descartes writes, “[God] was free to make it not true that all the radii of
the circle are equal—just as free as he was not to create the world” (ibid.).5
The first object of God’s free creation is mathematical truths, and the
doubt provoked by the omnipotent God in the First Meditation is also
raised with reference to simple propositions of mathematics, hence the
example of the addition of two and three and the enumeration of the
sides of a square. We must first see, then, if the dependency of mathe-
matical truths on divine power warrants any doubt regarding these
truths; and second, we must see if this doubt corresponds to, or is
exhausted by, the doubt generated by the deceiving God in the First
Meditation. Descartes’ response to the first issue can be found in the
first formulation of his thesis on the dependency of mathematical
truths on divine power. In fact, in his letter to Mersenne from April 15,
1630, Descartes places himself in the position of the reader, discussing
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the possibility that God could have established as true the opposite of
that which appears to us as necessarily true (CSMK 23; AT I 145–6). In a
fictional dialogue, he preemptively refutes the objection that the reader
would have surely raised: if God had freely established eternal truths,
God could also change them. For Descartes then, it was clear that, first,
his innovative theory could generate doubt concerning the necessarily
true propositions, and second, that this doubt, from the Cartesian per-
spective, concerned the permanence of truth. Moreover, Descartes imme-
diately rejects this doubt: given that God is immutable, these truths, once
established as immutable, cannot be altered.6Nevertheless, the need to
reject doubt about the permanence of truth already appears to be an
admission of the legitimacy of such doubt. There is, therefore, at least
some kind of doubt concerning truth that is plausible within the theory
of the free creation of eternal truths. We must now consider whether
this is the doubt Descartes raises with the hypothesis of divine decep-
tion in the First Meditation, and additionally, whether the doubt in the
First Meditation is conceivable solely through the doctrine of the
dependency of truth on the free act of divine creation.
2. The Order of the Meditations
A reading of doubt in the First Meditation in light of a theory of the
free creation of eternal truths must address at least two problems. The
first problem is the absence of such a theory within the Meditations, an
absence that cannot be explained in terms of causal reasons, given the
vehement clarity with which Descartes formulates this theory when
responding to the sixth set of objections (CSM II 293–4; AT VII 435–6), and
also when replying to Gassendi (CSM II 261; AT VII 380). The second
problem is that the very strategy of the Meditations, which is particularly
evident in the First Meditation, problematizes the use of the doctrine that
Descartes formulates explicitly in contrast to all preceding theological tra-
ditions. This latter case presents the greatest obstacle for explaining the
nature of the doubt generated by the omnipotent God in the appeal to
the free creation of eternal truths. 
Interpreters who to some extent rely on the doctrine of the free cre-
ation of eternal truths in order to understand the nature and focus of
doubt in mathematics in the First Meditation, implicitly presuppose
that a “naïve” reading of the First Meditation and of the Meditations in
general—that is, an ignorant reading of Cartesian physics and meta-
physics—is destined to fail. And furthermore, these readers argue that in
order to understand the Meditations it is necessary to understand all of
Cartesian thought, including doctrines such as the doctrine on the free
creation of eternal truths, even though these doctrines had not yet been
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published at the time Descartes was writing the Meditations. Actually,
the question concerning the problem of the presence or absence of the
doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths within the First Meditation
may be stated in this way: how necessary is it to know the whole of
Descartes’ œuvre to understand the Meditations? If we take seriously
what Descartes himself says concerning the structure of the Meditations,
the response should be that this knowledge is not necessary at all.
Descartes composed meditations, not a treatise, in order to make this
new philosophy emerge from established knowledge and from common
prejudices. The new philosophy must be achieved gradually, by slowly
ridding oneself of the prejudices that initially completely possess the
mind of whomever decides to fully embrace the path of liberation.
Cartesian physics and metaphysics provide a landing point; they are not
a prerequisite for the meditative process. Descartes tells Marin Mersenne
in a letter dated January 28, 1641, that the Meditations contain “all of the
fundamentals of my physics,” but these should not be immediately
revealed to readers entrenched in Aristotelian prejudices because, in this
way, they will “gradually get used to my principles . . . before they notice
that they destroy the principles of Aristotle” (CSMK 23; AT III 297–8).
The Meditations are intended to guide the reader to an understanding of
Cartesian physics without the reader needing to preemptively renounce
Aristotelianism but instead by helping the reader see this physics emerge
through gradual modification and abandonment of opposing assump-
tions. The protagonist of the meditative exercise must modify himself
internally, beginning with his own cultural knowledge; and the reader, in
line with Descartes’ intentions, must completely become one with that
protagonist: “I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who
are able and willing to meditate seriously with me” (CSM II 8; AT VII 9).
If we take seriously what the literary form of a meditation implies,
then this should convince us that the “order of reasons” or the “analytical
order” on which the Meditations are constructed should be interpreted in
a much broader and more complex manner than is often admitted. Not
only does this mean avoiding a petitio principii, assuring oneself that
what is being established does not depend on knowledge not yet
acquired, nor does it only mean disposing of the ideas according to the
order of discovery instead of a logical order (CSM II 110–1; AT VII
155–6), but it also means accepting the fact that the same ideas that
are used change their meaning and thus can indicate different doc-
trines in the process.7 If the Aristotelian must be insensibly guided
toward truth, it will be necessary that she first recognize herself in the
ideas used at the very beginning of the meditation, and then that those
ideas are gradually modified so that she no longer recognizes them as
her own. 
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It is not by chance that all interpreters who have explicitly rejected
the use of the doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths referred to
the logic of the order of reasons in the Meditations. One of the first to do
so was Martial Gueroult who, arguing against Bréhier, rejected the pres-
ence of the omnipotent Cartesian God in the First Meditation by invoking
the order of reasons, which shows that the clear and distinct idea of God
had not yet been achieved at that stage in the Meditations.8 However,
Gueroult’s order of reasons is after all a logical order, in which, accord-
ing to Descartes, that which precedes does not logically depend on that
which follows. Moreover, Gueroult himself took some concepts from the
First Meditation to express what he takes to be true Cartesian thought.9
Harry Frankfurt’s reading of the First Meditation remains closer to the
meditative order: not only is the protagonist of the Meditations a man
who does not yet posses Cartesian knowledge, but above all he is a man
who has other theories, in particular the naïve and pre-philosophical the-
ories derived from common sense. The knowledge confirmed by the First
Meditation can neither be interpreted in light of a Descartes who has
completed the meditative journey nor can it be assumed in order to
interpret any Cartesian doctrine because such an interpretation runs
the risk of confusing the reader-meditator’s pre-philosophical state with
Cartesian philosophy.10
However, it is reductive to view the reader-meditator of the Meditations
only as having a naïve level of common sense; there is no lack of sophisti-
cated doctrines that can be cited in order to illustrate the reader’s initial
ideas; so his “naïvety” can be taken literally and not just in reference to
common sense naïvety.11 As inferred from the previously cited letter to
Mersenne, the reader-meditator of the First Meditation is a sophisticated
man, indoctrinated in the philosophy of the time, and particularly—but
not exclusively—in the scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy, from whose
shadows the Meditations will lead the reader to Cartesian enlighten-
ment. The premise that all knowledge comes from the senses, cited by
Descartes as the fundamental belief from which he departed at the
beginning of the meditative journey, is certainly a spontaneous belief
adopted in infancy.12 But it is also, and maybe above all, a premise of the
scholastic-Aristotelian philosophy ingrained in the reader-meditator. If
common sense is present, it is because, for Descartes, Aristotelianism is a
sophisticated systematization of prejudices that are adopted in infancy
and that feed common sense. Therefore, in order to reconstruct the intel-
lectual persona of the meditator, we must engage a system of refined
philosophical beliefs, and it is only appropriate to draw on this system
of beliefs if we wish to understand Descartes’ thesis and the ordering of
problems presented at the beginning of the meditative journey. Thus,
in the following sections we will see whether this system of beliefs
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indeed allows the interpretation of doubt motivated by the divine deceit
by the idea of the free creation of eternal truths.
3. God and Mathematics in the First Meditation
In order to use the doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths as an
interpretive tool, two conditions have to be met: first, there has to be a
clear and distinct idea of divine power;13 second, eternal truths, and
therefore mathematical truths, must be conceived in such a way that it
is legitimate to cite that power as their source. In fact, not every theory
about the nature of mathematics allows a submission of mathematics
to the divine creative power, even when there is a clear and distinct
notion of divine power. Descartes emphasizes that the ideas of mathe-
matics must be created by God because “these . . . are something,”14
and therefore they depend on God just as every real being does. In other
words, a Platonic conception of mathematics that attributes reality to
mathematical entities is necessary for explaining the dependency of such
entities on the divine order. If the objects of mathematics were unreal
entities or abstract ideas derived from the experience of external bod-
ies, that is, if such entities depended for their existence on the mind
that thinks them or on the body in which they exist, then they would
not have a reality, at least unto themselves, and therefore it would not
make sense to think of them as created by God. As has been widely
noted, Descartes explicitly theorizes the Platonic conception of mathemat-
ics in the Fifth Meditation. However, it remains to be seen whether this
is already present in the First Meditation. In short, in order to under-
stand if the doctrine of the free creation of eternal truths is present in
the First Meditation, we must consider whether its assumptions are
also present within this meditation.
A clear and distinct idea of infinite divine power is conspicuously
absent from the First Meditation. The reader-meditator does not have a
clear and distinct notion of God, but rather has a “long-standing opin-
ion” of him: “And yet firmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing
opinion that there is an omnipotent God” (CSM II 14; AT VII 21). Nor
is a clear and distinct idea of the infinite divine power necessary to
hypothesize deception, insofar as “lesser” things such as “fate or chance
or a continuous chain of events” can also bring forth deception, and “the
less powerful [such things] make my original cause, the more likely it is
that I am so imperfect as to be deceived all the time” (ibid.), while nec-
essary truths depend solely on the divine power of God. The question
concerning mathematics is nuanced, especially because the reader does
not find explicit indications of the conception of mathematics in the
First Meditation. But the mystery only arises for the modern reader. As
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Mark Olson has demonstrated, a contemporary of Descartes would not
have struggled to recognize the Aristotelian theory of mathematics pre-
sent in the First Meditation, which was shared by most scholastic
thinkers of Descartes’ time.15
The Aristotelian philosophy of mathematics, as theorized by Thomas
Aquinas, views mathematical concepts as abstract ideas obtained from
external bodies. Knowledge starts with singular bodies, whose qualita-
tive characteristics are perceived by the senses, and develops by distin-
guishing the species—that is, the universal descriptions of individual
classes—and the “common sensibles,” or the characteristics that the
bodies possess in virtue of being subject to quantification; the latter
constitute the condition of knowledge because they provide the “proper
sensibles,” or the qualities that are directly felt.16 Knowledge of the quan-
titative characteristics common to singular bodies is obtained in this
way, regardless of the “individual perceptible matter” of these character-
istics; in this case, the content of knowledge is the “common perceptible
matter.” The physical sciences function at this level, whereas mathe-
matical knowledge aims at a higher level of abstraction. In fact, it is
possible to abstract from “common perceptible matter” by just consider-
ing “common intelligible matter” (ST I q.85, a.1). 
The reality that exists outside of the mind is still central to “common
perceptible matter” insofar as it constitutes a shared component of all bod-
ies, while knowledge of “common intelligible matter” excludes reference to
external existence. Like physical science, mathematics considers the ele-
ments common to all bodies, yet it considers them not so much as com-
ponents of external bodies but rather as concepts through which the
notion of “substance” is given in its quantitative aspect. Common mat-
ter, which was “perceptible” in physics, now becomes “intelligible” mat-
ter. Physics abstracts from singular bodies but not from existing common
matter; mathematics abstracts from already existing common matter but
not from the concept of “substance” and its quantitative characteristics;
and finally, metaphysics looks beyond even common intelligible matter,
operating at a further level of abstraction (ibid.).17
The Aquinian theory of abstraction can be traced out in the stages of
doubt within the First Meditation, where it is discussed, along with the
knowledge of material things, in the context of the gradual abstraction
of the knowledge of external bodies, following the hypothesis that all
perceptions of the external world are really just a dream. According to
this hypothesis, the mind introduces complex ideas out of simple ele-
ments, despite these ideas not existing in the external world. Yet, such
elements could not have been invented on their own. Thus, even if all of
experience were a continuous dream, there are things that are “simplest
and most general” (CSM II 14; AT VII 20)—that nevertheless remain
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real—that is, they exist outside of the mind. This is the case even if the
singular forms (e.g., individual bodies) do not exist and even if the parts
of these forms—the eyes, the head, and the hands—are a product of
the imagination.
It must at least be admitted that certain other even simpler and
more universal things are real. . . . This class appears to include cor-
poreal nature in general, and its extension; the shape of extended
things; the quantity, or size and number of these things; the place in
which they may exist, the time through which they may endure, and
so on. (CSM II 14; AT VII 20) 
The protagonist acquires knowledge from these simple and universal
elements despite lack of existential reference. Therefore, it holds true
that “whether I am awake or asleep,” mathematics is still operative,
“for whether I am awake or asleep, two and three added together are
five” (ibid.). The hypothesis of the dream therefore rejects the truth of all
knowledge that attributes an external reality to the images derived from
the composition of simple elements, but it leaves intact both the existence
of those elements and the operation that the mind carries out when it
considers them pure concepts devoid of existential reference.
In the hypothesis of the deceiving omnipotent God, doubt reaches
the ultimate level when both kinds of knowledge operating in the
dream argument are consecutively rejected, making it possible to doubt
both the existence of the final components of external reality and the
truth of mathematical operations.18 The Cartesian list of simple and
universal things through which the deceiving God exercises his power
intersects with the Aquinian list of quantitative characteristics common to
all forms that are known through abstraction from the bodies them-
selves: “figura . . . quantitas . . . magnitudo et numerus . . . locus . . . tem-
pus [shape, quantity, size and number, place, time], lists Descartes (CSM
II 14; AT VII 20); “motus, quies, numerus, figura, et magnitudo [motion,
rest, number, shape, and size],” lists Aquinas, following Aristotle.19 The
fact that the “simple and general things” operative in mathematics are
not themselves the mathematical entities later discussed in the Fifth
Meditation but are the abstract characteristics of the “common percepti-
ble matter” in the sense common to the Aristotelian tradition, can be
inferred first from the way in which such things come to be known:
they are not known innately but are obtained by extracting the simple
and general elements from the knowledge of external bodies. Second,
the same otherwise enigmatic passage from simple elements endowed
with external existence to mathematics, first in the dream hypothesis
and then in the hypothesis of divine deception, is properly explained
only if this knowledge concerns the same elements at two different levels
of abstraction, as is already the case in the Aquinian theory. Finally,
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the very terminology used by Descartes confirms the presence of this
scholastic theory. Matter, considered as something simple and general,
is referred to by Descartes as “corporeal nature in general [in com-
muni]” (CSM II 14; AT VII 20)—that is, by using the technical term
with which Aquinas indicated the matter common to all singular bodies
that is known by way of abstraction from them: “materia est duplex,
scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis [matter is twofold: com-
mon and sealed or individual]” (ST I q.85, a.1; emphasis added).20
The scholastic and Cartesian views of mathematics are not only dif-
ferent, they are radically incompatible. In the scholastic theory of
mathematics, only singular bodies exist outside of the mind; mathe-
matical entities do not have any real existence independent of the bod-
ies from which they are abstracted. They exist only in the mind of
someone who has carried out the process of abstraction. In Cartesian
theory, the entities of mathematics are independent both of their exempli-
fication in singular bodies and of the mind thinking them:
I find within me countless ideas of things which even though they
may not exist anywhere outside me still cannot be called nothing;
for although in a sense they can be thought of at will, they are not
my invention but have their own true and immutable natures.
(CSM II 44; AT VII 64)
The first view outlined here is an empiricist conception of mathematics,
while the second is a Platonic conception. The second cognitive model is
attained only after the pretenses of the first model (which require that
all knowledge should be obtained from the senses) have been nullified.
Descartes discovers the second model in the Fifth Meditation, after hav-
ing bracketed all knowledge of external bodies. And, as we know, it is
only the Platonic model that is amenable to theorizing a creative rela-
tionship between God and mathematical entities.
The fact that the philosophy of mathematics in the First Meditation is
founded on the Aquinian theory of abstraction—that is, founded on the
prevailing theory that was repeated in Descartes’ time—should already be
convincing enough to show that an educated reader would have read the
Aristotelian-Aquinian theory (and not the Cartesian one) within the First
Meditation. This is in line, moreover, with the Cartesian project to guide
the meditator on a path starting from common cultural knowledge.
Nevertheless, I will support this claim with textual evidence, dating a
few decades after the original publication of the Meditations, from
which it follows not only that in 1701 the common theory of abstrac-
tion was still the Aristotelian-Aquinian theory, the one echoed in the
First Meditation, but also that this was intended as irreducible and in
opposition to the Cartesian-Platonic theory of the Fifth Meditation.
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This evidence comes from John Norris, a Malebranchian well known for
his deep ties to scholasticism.21 In his compelling work, An Essay towards
the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World, Norris opposes the abstrac-
tion of the ideal essences of things known in God (in a Malebranchian
sense) to the common “Doctrine of Abstraction.”22 According to this doc-
trine, there is a triple abstraction of matter, on which a triple distinction
of the sciences is modeled: 
Physics is said to Abstract from Matter, but tis only singular Matter
. . . Mathematics is said to Abstract not only from singular Matter,
but even from Matter in common, but not really, but only Secundum
Rationem, as being really conversant about material Beings, tho’ not
defined with respect to them as such. (ETII 59)
Metaphysics is abstracted from all matter, both singular and common.
It is also notable that not only is mathematics presented according to
the Aquinian model—that is, as the product of the abstraction from
common perceptible matter—but that the terminology remains the
same in the passage from Aquinas to Descartes to Norris: materia com-
munis [common matter] (Aquinas), natura corporea in communi [corpo-
real nature in common] (Descartes), matter in common (Norris). 
According to this theory of abstraction, mathematics only exists in
the mind, and singular bodies only exist in reality. The shapes “in real-
ity” are given only if the bodies are given. Nevertheless, they can
become the focus of a study independent from bodies “for the way in
which they are considered” (ETII 60) or, rather, by mentally abstracting
some characteristics from the bodies that in reality are never found on
their own. According to Norris, the Cartesian-Malebranchian concep-
tion of mathematics is opposed to the common theory of abstraction. In
fact, if mathematical entities as such are considered the content of
intelligible knowledge and not abstractions from perceptible knowledge,
then geometry is no longer abstracted from matter “not only according
to the manner of Conception but also in very deed and reality, and so is
every whit as Abstract a Science as Metaphysics, as being equally con-
versant about the Immaterial Objects of the Intelligible World” (ibid.).
The common (Aristotelian) doctrine of abstraction works by separating in
the mind that which in reality is not separate, while the Cartesian-
Malebranchian theory views mathematical entities in their true separa-
tion from the bodies in which they can be exemplified. For this reason the
two theories are irreducible to one another.
Due to its chronological proximity to the Cartesian text, Norris’ Essay
offers a valuable tool for deciphering what the educated reader of the
time would have read in the Meditations, namely the scholastic theory of
mathematics founded on the presupposition that all knowledge is derived
GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL
10
from perceptible experience in the First Meditation, and a Platonic the-
ory of mathematics that is opposed to it in the Fifth Meditation. Both the
deceiving God and the mathematics addressed in the First Meditation
are therefore opposed to the respective Cartesian theories: the deceiving
God of the First Meditation is the author of a deception that does not
require an infinite power, while the Cartesian God is truthful and
infinitely powerful; the mathematical theory of the First Meditation is
Aristotelian and empiricist, while Cartesian theory is Platonic and ideal-
ist. It therefore does not seem possible to rest a doctrine so closely tied
to Cartesian metaphysics and to the Cartesian mathematical theory,
such as the free creation of eternal truths, on pillars that are so thor-
oughly pre-Cartesian, if not anti-Cartesian. 
4. The Nature of Doubt
If the conditions for establishing the theory of the free creation of eter-
nal truths are absent in the First Meditation, then the deception car-
ried out by the God of long-standing opinion (vetus opinio) cannot be
related to the deception that is possible only for God, the creator of
essences; nor can it be tied generally to the foundations of the new
Cartesian science for which it is nevertheless imperative to include the
philosophy of mathematics from the Fifth Meditation. On the one hand,
the deception of the First Meditation should be read as a pre-Cartesian
trick and be considered “traditional,” like the knowledge that it brings
into question. On the other hand, this deception should be able to make
any human knowledge uncertain. And yet, if the mathematics that is dis-
cussed in the First Meditation exists only in the mind—which evidently
makes it a product of abstraction—then only the power that God has over
the mind, and not the power that God has over things, concerns deception
in mathematics. 
The God of the Ockhamist tradition is a God that has power over the
mind but not over eternal truths, and that, acting on behalf of that power,
can enact irremediable deceit, as described in Tullio Gregory’s well-known
article on the scholastic origins of the Cartesian deceiving God.23 However,
perhaps it is not necessary to go back in time as far as Gregory has led
us. In the rich dossier of possible sources concerning the Cartesian deceiv-
ing God, there is one potential source that has long been neglected,
despite its chronological proximity to Descartes and the fact that
Descartes would have certainly been familiar with it, which should have
privileged it above all others: it is the discourse on the possible divine ori-
gins of error that Francisco Suárez examines in disputation 9 of his
Disputationes metaphysicae, titled “De falsitate seu falso.”24 Descartes cer-
tainly had first-hand knowledge of Suárez’s Disputationes: in fact, he
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mentions this text in his response to Arnauld in order to support his
theory of the material falsehood of ideas (CSM II 164–5; AT VII 235).
However, Suárez deserves to be remembered not only for the doctrine of
the material falsehood of ideas, which is indeed marginal within Cartesian
philosophy. In fact, in the second section of disputation 9, Suárez advances
a more than significant thesis for the foundation of Cartesian science,
namely the thesis according to which error is always voluntary while only
truth produces inviolable [invincibile] assent in the mind.
Suárez questions the origins of error and begins by expressing his
desire to address the question from a philosophical and not a theologi-
cal point of view, which involves omitting a return to original sin and
seeking to understand only the natural cause of error.25 Error is made
possible through the fact that, at times, one does not achieve a clear
understanding of what one judges. In fact, when the understanding is
not clear, the assent to truth is no longer necessary but rather is volun-
tary, and where the assent is voluntary, it can produce error: 
Intellect can be compelled to truth, but not to falsity, speaking in
the absolute sense and regardless of any other consideration. And
the idea in its act can never sustain a false judgment, if not for the
free movement of will. In fact, barring necessity, the intellect can
only be determined to the judgment by the will as the intellect is
not free . . . . Therefore, true fallacy, that is, fallacy that obtains a
false judgment always has its cause close to human will. (DM 9.2.6) 
The reason for the mind’s different reactions to truth and falsehood is
that the intellect is necessarily determined to make a judgment only
with the presence of the evidence of a known fact, and this evidence can
never be a vehicle for falsity, “as it is grounded on the thing itself, or
must necessarily be resolved in a clear and demonstrated principle”
(ibid.). Discussing the origins of error, Suárez therefore located the cri-
teria for recognizing truth within the necessity of assent. 
Suárez’s objection to this thesis takes the form of a hypothesis of a
deceit that would compel assent by an external agent. In such a case,
error would be involuntary and the inviolable assent would no longer
be a certain sign of truth. As noted above, the Suárezian problem of the
Disputatio becomes central to the Meditations: If that which is not
doubtable is the only natural sign that the human mind has in order to
discern the true from the false, does it mean that what is impossible to
doubt is also necessarily true? According to Suárez, and later Descartes,
the hypothesis of an inviolable error provoked by an external agent
assumes the form of a malevolent angel (angelus malus)—an evil genius
for Descartes—and of a deceitful God capable of causing the mind to irre-
sistibly assent to falsehood: “You will say: sometimes the intellect can be
compelled by an external cause, God or an angel, who, if malevolent,
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can propose a false thing in such a way that the intellect cannot dis-
sent” (DM 9.2.7). The hypothesis of an inviolable trick carried out by a
superior creature is not an exercise in philosophical fantasy, according
to Suárez. In fact, it is a metaphysical translation of a frequent experi-
ence when something false appears to us as irresistibly true: 
In confirmation, it will be noted that at times what appears to be evi-
dent is only an appearance [apperens tantum]: therefore in this case,
its content can be false, and it can nevertheless compel the intellect no
less than it would if it were true. (DM 9.2.7)26
If God or the malevolent angel could perform such a trick, it would be
impossible to distinguish true knowledge from false knowledge using
the criteria provided by Suárez, that is by the presence or lack of invio-
lable assent.
Suárez adopts two different arguments to reject the hypothesis of
irresistible deceit carried out in the mind either by God or by a malevo-
lent angel. In the case of God, the hypothesized deceit would constitute
an action above the natural order, which is possible only by divine
power.27 Furthermore, given that God is inherently good, his goodness
makes it impossible for him to exercise that power, and therefore God
cannot in any way be the origin of falsity.28 In the case of the angelus
malus [evil angel], the hypothesized deceit is absolutely impossible
because the angel has no power over the human intellect and therefore
can never produce irresistible assent. At most, the malevolent angel
can use rhetorical strategies to produce false judgments, which never-
theless are always refutable.29 Although the malevolent angel’s actions
do not contradict Suárezian doctrine, if God were not both benovelent
and omnipotent, the theory according to which irresistible assent is
always a certain sign of truth would become unsustainable.
Many elements demonstrate how Suárez’s text works in close con-
nection with Descartes’ Meditations. Suárez’s theory of error anticipates
Descartes in the Fourth Meditation almost verbatim: error is always the
product of free choice and therefore always avoidable, argues Descartes,
and only truth makes assent possible. In general, Suárez’s question con-
cerning irresistible assent as a sure mark of truth becomes a central
problem of the Cartesian text. The idea that we can ground the truth of
propositions that we cannot doubt on God’s goodness is a sort of synopsis
of the Meditations. Related to the hypothesis of the deceiving God, it is
striking that Suárez’s discourse on the possible deceit carried out by God
or by an angel does not occur in the traditional context of examining
divine power but instead occurs within the discussion on the differences
between the true and the false and the possibility of tracing a sure sign
of truth. And similarly, it is striking that the hypothesis of the deceiving
13
SCRIBANO/DIVINE DECEPTION IN DESCARTES’ MEDITATIONS
God is only cited in order to present an insurmountable obstacle to
obtaining a certain criterion for distinguishing the true from the false.
But there are also other details that are worth discussing. 
First, Suárez distinguishes the power of God from the power of the
angelus malus in a manner that fully accounts for the distinction in
Descartes’ text. Not only are the areas of deceit different—the belief
concerning external objects in the case of the demon, and the belief con-
cerning matter that lacks external existence in the case of God30—but
there is also a difference in the quality of the deceit: one can always
resist the deceit of the evil genius, while it would be impossible to avoid
God’s deceit because he would achieve it by creating irresistible assent
within the mind. “Man can always dissent or at least suspend his con-
sent, if he desires” (DM 9.2.7), Suárez states in reference to the deceit
of the angelus malus. And Descartes, while addressing the same evil
genius, underlines the ability of the meditator to not concede his assent:
I shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this meditation; and, even if
it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall at least do what is
in my power, that is, resolutely guard against assenting to any
falsehoods, so that the deceiver, however powerful and cunning he
may be, will be unable to impose on me in the slightest degree.
(CSM II 15; AT VII 23) 
In contrast, divine deceit would make it impossible to refuse to assent
to falsehood. The assent to false propositions, in this case, would be
necessary as the assent to the propositions cited at the beginning of the
Third Meditation: 
Let whoever can do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that
I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am something; or
make it true at some future time that I have never existed, since it
is now true that I exist; or bring it about that two and three added
together are more or less than five, or anything of this kind in
which I see a manifest contradiction. (CSM II 25; AT VII 36).
Second, Suárez admits the possibility of the deceit given divine
omnipotence but rejects such a possibility on the basis of God’s good-
ness: “God cannot induce false intellect, because this is offensive to his
goodness no less than lying” (DM 9.2.7). Descartes echoes this thought:
“But perhaps God would not have allowed me to be deceived in this way,
since he is said to be supremely good” (CSM II 14; AT VII 21). In the
first rejection of the hypothesis of divine deceit, the emphasis of
Descartes’ claim of God’s goodness (and not God’s omnipotence) symbol-
izes the pre-Cartesian origins of the God of the First Meditation.
Descartes’ God is incapable of deceipt due to his omnipotence or his
truthfulness, or more generally because of his perfection (CSM II 35;
AT VII 52), not due to his putative goodness, which is an attribute that
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Descartes’ theology judges to be arbitrary. Thus, Descartes’ text demon-
strates the completely pre-Cartesian source of the inhibition of deceit
through appeal to God’s goodness. Moreover, divine goodness, like the
deceiving God of the First Meditation, is presented as a vetus opinio: God
is not good, but “is said to be” supremely good. Later, Descartes is
required to address the everyday experience of error, which is appar-
ently in conflict with divine goodness and also with deceit, leaving open
a pathway for a meditative process that was closed too quickly by
Suárez’s claim concerning divine goodness: “But if it were inconsistent
with his goodness to have created me such that I am deceived all the
time, it would seem equally foreign to his goodness to allow me to be
deceived even occasionally” (CSM II 14; AT VII 21). It is well known
that all of the Fourth Meditation is dedicated to rejecting the presupposed
incompatibility between error and a truthful God, which in the First
Meditation was used in order to sustain the fledgling meditative process.
Third, Suárez makes the hypothesis of divine deceit conceivable and
credible given the parallel with natural deceit concerning the appear-
ance of evidence. Divine deceit shares a parallel quality with cases of
persistent failure—in cases where the appearance of truth forces assent
as if the mind really faces the true: 
In confirmation, it will be noted that at times what appears to be evi-
dent is only an appearance [apperens tantum]: therefore, in this case,
its content can be the false, and it can nevertheless compel the intellect
to assent no less than it would if this content were the true. (DM 9.2.7)
Each time Descartes raises the hypothesis of divine deceit, it is supported
with the same example: “What is more, since I sometimes believe that
others go astray in cases where they think they have the most perfect
knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three?”
(CSM II 14; AT VII 21; emphasis added). Moreover, the analogy of divine
deceit with natural deceit provides a clear explanation for interchange-
ability in the cause of the deceit that is manifested in the First
Meditation: it is either divine power or a defect in nature. 
Finally, divine deceit is true deceit, akin to a lie; it is not a manifes-
tation of omnipotence characterized in non-moral terms. Descartes
underlines deceit’s truthfulness several times: “fallat me quisquis
potest [anyone can deceive me]”; “aliquem Deum . . . deceptorem [God
deceives]” (CSM II 25; AT VII 36); “me deludat [I am deceived]” (CSM
II 19; AT VII 29). It is for this reason that deceit can, according to Suárez,
or could, according to Descartes, be impeded by God’s goodness: “God
cannot induce false intellect, because this is offensive to his goodness”
(DM 9.2.7). Descartes echoes this idea: “But perhaps God would not have
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allowed me to be deceived in this way, since he is said to be supremely
good” (CSM II 14; AT VII 21). 
If the deceit hypothesized by Suárez is the same deceit discussed in
Descartes, it follows that the deceit of the First Meditation implies an
absolute divine power over the mind insofar as the mind is created by
God. Like Descartes, Suárez insists that deceiving the mind is possible
because the mind is a divine work. Suárez writes that “the angel can-
not determine the judgment of the intellect . . . only God can do this,
who is its creator,” and Descartes describes “an omnipotent God who
made me the kind of creature I am” (CSM II 21; AT VII 14; emphases
added). However, it also follows that divine deceit, according to Descartes,
does not necessarily indicate a divine power over truth and falsehood.
Rather, the Suárezian source of the divine deceit hypothesized by
Descartes adds an additional difficulty to the alliance between the
deceiving God of the First Meditation and the God who is the free cre-
ator of eternal truths. Though it is precarious to make such claims, if
there is a conclusion of which we can be sure, it is that Suárez is
Descartes’ adversary, above all others, regarding the doctrine of the
free creation of eternal truths. As is widely known, Suárez is the
philosopher who made eternal truths independent from divine will,
suggesting that such truths would remain valid even if God did not
exist.31 And it appears at least improbable that Suárez above all others
is at the same time an adversary of the doctrine of the free creation of
eternal truths and the source of a hypothesis of divine deceit inspired by
that doctrine. A God who has absolute power over the mind but submits
to the truth is sufficient for demonstrating that the truth of science is
inaccessible to the human mind. For complete scientific knowledge being
beyond the reach of the human mind, it is not necessary for God to estab-
lish different truths from those that actually exist or make true tomor-
row what is false today. It is sufficient that these truths are such that
what is true may seem false to the human mind. 
The way doubt is discussed in the Meditations confirms such a read-
ing of divine deceit. Suárez’s hypothesis, as noted above, is that divine
deceit is manifested by creating an appearance of evidence in the mind:
“what appears to be evident is only an appearance [apparens tantum].”
It is this explicitly indicated doubt at the beginning of the Third Meditation
that keeps the gap between indubitability and truth open. In fact, this
passage fuels the fear not that what “is” evident can be false, but that
what “appears” to be evident can be otherwise in reality: “circa illa
deciperer, quae manifestissima viderentur [I may have been deceived
even concerning things which seemed to me most manifest]” (and not
“quae manifestissima sunt [that are most manifest]”); “quae me puto
mentis oculis quam evidentissime intueri [what appears to be the best
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evidence]” (and not “quae evidentissime intueor [what is the best evi-
dence]”); “quas valde clare percipere arbitror [perceptions that appear
to me very clearly]” (and not “quas clare percipio [perceptions that are
clear]”) (CSM II 25; AT VII 36). Both Descartes and Suárez cast the gap
between evidence and truth as the gap between the appearance of evi-
dence and evidence itself. Beyond the characterization of the deceiving
God and the evil genius, the nature of doubt itself, as described by
Descartes, shows that this is the same doubt that Suárez had intro-
duced as an objection against the relationship between irresistible
assent and truth. 
5. Non-Corrupt Nature
Twice throughout the Meditations—once at the beginning of the Third
Meditation and once in the Fifth Meditation—doubt contends directly
with either the hypothesis of a God that creates incorrigible deceit within
the mind or with a human nature that is inherently flawed. Concerning
the theory of mathematics, the two discussions are separated by an
abyss: while the Cartesian theory of mathematics is not yet formulated
in the Third Meditation, it is fully theorized in the Fifth Meditation,
together with the innatist theory that makes it possible.32 It follows that
in the wake of Suárez, divine deceit at the beginning of the Third
Meditation must be carried out in the mind and not through truth, since
the necessary conditions for providing the theory of the free creation of
eternal truths are lacking at this stage of the mediator’s journey. But as
we have seen, Descartes raises doubt again in the Fifth Meditation in
order to restate that only after proving God’s existence can science con-
sider itself wholly certain and founded. In the Fifth Meditation, doubt
returns with the same elements that characterized it in the First
Meditation, and also at the beginning of the Third Meditation: 
I can convince myself that I have a natural disposition to go wrong
from time to time in matters which I think I perceive as evidently
as can be. This will seem even more likely when I remember that
there have been frequent cases where I have regarded things as true
and certain, but have later been led by other arguments to judge
them to be false. (CSM II 48; AT VII 70; emphasis added) 
Again, doubt rests on the possibility that what I think I understand
cannot be truly understood, and doubt once again manifests itself in
the examples of false beliefs that the writer does not doubt.
Throughout the Meditations, several events lead to a radical change in
the ideas that the reader-meditator entertained at the beginning of his
journey. Above all, the change in the theory of God’s nature makes the
doubt of mathematics conceived in the First Meditation unattainable. But
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this doubt remains unchanged throughout the Meditations, and always
includes the possibility that the human mind is incapable of possessing
sufficient means with which to distinguish the true from the false, either
because of a congenital defect or because it is induced supernaturally.
The conclusion that these reflections suggest is that, for Descartes,
the threat to the certainty and reliability of science is only based on the
lack of integrity of human nature. It is not based on the relationship
between the creator and the mind, and not on the relationship between
the creator and the content of knowledge. Descartes’ fear is not that the
universe that rational inquiry aims to reveal is truqué [rigged], to use
Henri Gouhier’s famous expression,33 or that God changes the truth in
the course of time. Rather, the fear is that human nature is imperfect. To
understand this it is in no way necessary to imagine that God has power
over essences or truths in such a way that would make it impossible for
the atheist to be free from such a fear.
This conclusion heavily influences the judgment of the entire project
of the Meditations. According to the underlying strategy at work in this
text, the project’s critical stakes lie in the possibility of demonstrating
that the human mind has a perfect origin—a genuine God—and that,
therefore, the mind is perfect, like everything that is produced by the
hands of that creator: “It would therefore be a contradiction that any-
thing should be created by him which positively tends towards false-
hood” (CSM II 103; AT VII 104). The consequence is that the human
mind is able to achieve truth with its own means and without super-
natural assistance. The paradox, or rather the audacious coherence, of
Cartesian metaphysics consists in having reclaimed a clear and distinct
understanding of the divine nature for the finite mind in order to free it
from every supernatural assistance—grace, revelation—in the conquest
of truth. It is not surprising then that the theologians—the authors of
the second set of objections—were the ones who had the most reason to
object to the Cartesian thesis that the human mind can achieve truth
on its own, and hence were more sensitive to the possibility of making
the mind self-reliant in its search for truth. The unnamed set of theolo-
gians and philosophers put the objection thus: 
How do you conclude that we cannot be deceived by him? . . . For if
God were to show us the pure truth, what eye, what mental vision,
could endure it? 
It is not, however, necessary to suppose that God is a deceiver in order
to explain your being deceived about matters which you think you
clearly and distinctly know. . . . Why should it not be in your nature to
be subject to constant—or at least very frequent—deception? How can
you establish with certainty that you are not deceived, or capable of
being deceived, in matters which you think you know clearly and
GRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL
18
distinctly? Have we not often seen people turn out to have been
deceived in matters where they thought their knowledge was as clear
as the sunlight? (CSM II 90; AT VII 126)
The relevant example drawn from the experience of that which only
appears to be self-evident reveals the doubt permeating the entire
Meditations is here raised as an objection to Descartes: doubt that
human nature is imperfect, or the idea that we can be supernaturally
deceived becomes a metaphor for a barrier between truth—which is
obviously divine, according to the theologians, because the human eye
cannot withstand the sight of it—and the finite mind. 
Descartes’ response to such an objection is precise:
In the case of our clearest and most careful judgments, however,
this kind of explanation would not be possible, for if such judgments
were false they could not be corrected by any clearer judgments
[plane affirmo] or by means of any other natural faculty. (CSM II
102–3; AT VII 143–4)
Descartes firmly defends the central point of his philosophy by assert-
ing the power of the human mind without supernatural assistance. It
was in fact the translator of the Meditations, the Duke of Luynes, who
felt slightly uncomfortable translating this confidence, and under
whose pen plane [clearly] became hardiment [boldly] (CSM II 103; AT
IX 113). It was certainly a bold move on Descartes’ part to wash away
every stain on human nature—even and obviously original sin—that
obstructed his achievement of the truth.
A modern reader of the Meditations might perhaps be more inter-
ested to see in the text a project of grounding the sciences that shields
them from the caprices of a God freely able to establish the rules of logic.
And perhaps the failure of that project, which condemns the human
mind to a metaphysical divorce from truth, is even more fascinating.
However, Descartes’ theological contemporaries, who knew nothing of
God as a free creator of the truth, read the Meditations otherwise and
accurately recognized in it the project to free the search for truth from
the natural imperfection of the human mind and the necessity of super-
natural assistance. It is against them and to resolve their doubt, or
rather to reformulate their certainty as a doubt, that the Meditations—a
text programmatically dedicated to the conversion of a reader captivated
by prejudices—was written. Because, if the theologians were correct, if
nature or the supernatural had produced an imperfect human reason in
need of external assistance, then the Cartesian program to ground the
sciences within finite reason would have failed from the very start.
Translated by Cosette Bruhns 
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1. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in vol. 2 of The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
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Meditations on First Philosophy (pp. 1–62) and Objections and Replies (pp.
63–398), will appear as CSM II, followed by page number; Meditationes de
prima philosophia, vol. 7 of Œuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adam and
Paul Tannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982), p. 21; henceforth references to the
Adam and Tannery edition will appear as AT, followed by volume in
Roman numerals and page number in Arabic numerals. 
2. The list of propositions that can be doubted if interpreted within the gen-
eral category of “clear and distinct ideas,” on behalf of the existence of a
deceiving God, which cannot be doubted when considered directly, ends
with a summary formula that includes all the propositions “in which . . . I
see a manifest contradiction” (CSM II 25; AT VII 36). 
3. In a letter to Denis Mesland, Descartes explicitly refers to God’s freedom to
not make it the case that “contradictories could not be true together” (René
Descartes to Denis Mesland, May 2, 1644, in René Descartes, The
Correspondence, vol. 3 of The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans.
John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991], p. 235; henceforth CSMK,
followed by page number; Descartes au Père Mesland, 2 mai 1644, in AT
IV 118. Émile Bréhier was the first to argue that Cartesian doubt is unin-
telligible regardless of the theory of God’s free creation of eternal truths
(Émile Bréhier, “La création des vérités éternelles dans le système de
Descartes,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 123:5–6
[1937], pp. 15–29). Martial Gueroult argued against Bréhier in The Soul
and God, vol. 1 of Descartes’ Philosophy Interpreted According to the Order
of Reasons, trans. Roger Ariew (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
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impressive defense of the role of the free creation of eternal truths in
Cartesian metaphysics, and of its presence even in the doubt of the First
Meditation (see Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes:
Analogie, création des verités éternelles et fondement [Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1981]).
4. It also happens that Descartes scholars who carry out their analyses of
doubt and certainty, moving programmatically on a psychological or epis-
temological level, reintroduce the free creation of eternal truths in order to
explain some aspect of the doubt or the achievement of truth. See, for
example, Jeffrey Tlumak, “Certainty and Cartesian Method,” in Descartes:
Critical and Interpretive Essays, ed. Michael Hooker (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 40–73, esp. 62–3. 
5. The example of rays surrounding a circle is given by Thomas Aquinas,
who uses it to illustrate the impassible boundaries of divine power (see
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. II, chap. 25).
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6. Descartes writes: “It will be said that if God had established these truths
he could change them as a king changes his laws. To this the answer is:
Yes he can, if his will can change. ‘But I understand them to be eternal
and unchangeable.’—I make the same judgment about God” (CSMK 23;
AT I 145–6).
7. This procedure was best clarified by Michel Foucault who wrote: “A medi-
tation implies, in short, a subject who is mobile and capable of being modi-
fied by the very effect of the discursive events that take place” (see “My
Body, This Paper, This Fire,” appendix 2 of History of Madness, trans.
Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa, ed. Jean Khalfa [London: Routledge,
2006], p. 563). 
8. See Martial Gueroult, “Cartesian Metaphysics and the Order of Reasons,”
chap. 1 of The Soul and God, vol. 1 of Descartes’ Philosophy Interpreted
According to the Order of Reasons, trans. Roger Ariew (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp. 3–11.
9. For example, on Gueroult’s reading, the theory of simple elements of reality
would already be the Cartesian one (see Martial Gueroult, “Cartesian
Metaphysics and the Order of Reasons,” p. 283nn.32–3). See also Harry
Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen: The Defense of Reason in
Descartes’Meditations (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. 56–8.
10. See Harry Frankfurt’s discussion of the protagonist of the Meditations in
his Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, pp. 48, 58–9, 61–7.  
11. For example, see the list of hypotheses on the origin of the self in the First
Meditation, where Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Aristotelianism are
respectively alluded to: “seu fato, seu casu, seu continuata rerum serie [by
fate or chance or a continuous chain of events]” (CSM II 14; AT VII 21). In
the Second Meditation, the lexicon used to characterize the disembodied
state of res cogitans includes the names taken from the Augustinian and
Aristotelian traditions that describe the disembodied condition of the
human being: “mens, sive animus, sive intellectus, sive ratio [mind, or
intelligence, or intellect, or reason]” (CSM II 18; AT VII 27).
12. For example, Descartes wrote, “Whatever I have up till now accepted as
most true I have acquired either from the senses or through the senses”
(CSM II 12; AT VII 18).
13. The assumption of the clear and distinct idea of infinite divine power is
already present in the initial formulation of the doctrine in the letter to
Mersenne dated April 15, 1630. In the same letter, Descartes asks
Mersenne to give wide publicity to the new doctrine so that “people get
used to speaking of God in a manner worthier, I think, than the common
and almost universal way of imagining him as a finite being” (CSMK 23;
AT I 146).
14. In his letter to Mersenne dated May 27, 1630, Descartes writes: “I know
that God is the author of everything and that these truths are something
and consequently that he is their author” (CSMK 25; AT I 152). In the
same letter the essences of created things are explicitly identified with
eternal truths: “For it is certain that he is the author of the essence of created
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things no less than of their existence; and this essence is nothing other
than the eternal truths” (ibid.). 
15. See Mark Olson, “Descartes’ First Meditation: Mathematics and the Laws
of Logic,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 26:3 (1998), pp. 407–38.  
16. “Common sensibles are all reducible to quantity” (Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologiæ, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province
[Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981], p. 84); I, q.78, a.3; hence-
forth ST, followed by part number, question number, and article number).
Aquinas provides examples of common sensibles in terms of size, number,
shape, movement, and stillness (ibid.).
17. The source of this idea in Aquinas is Aristotle’s Metaphysics XI.3, 1061a.
18. Descartes writes, “How do I know that he has not brought it about that
there is no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place,
while at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to
exist just as they do now? What is more, since I sometimes believe that
others go astray in cases where they think they have the most perfect
knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three?”
(CSM II 14; AT VII 21).
19. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, trans. Kenelm
Foster and Sylvester Humphries (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1951), bk. 2, §386. In this remark, Aquinas is commenting upon Aristotle,
On the Soul, II.5, 418a18–20.
20. When Descartes wishes to refer to corporeal nature—distinct from singu-
lar bodies and known to be independent of singular bodies—he refers to
corpus in genere [the body, taken in the general sense] (CSM II 10, 11; AT
VII 14, 15). When he refers to the abstract notion of matter pertaining to
the scholastic doctrine, he instead speaks of corpora in communi [bodies in
general] a concept that, precisely because of its abstractness, is even more
confused than the individual body, which obviously does not hold for the
Cartesian idea of extension. Descartes elaborates this idea in the Second
Meditation: “The things which people commonly think they understand
most distinctly of all; that is, the bodies which we touch and see. I do not
mean bodies in general—for general perceptions are apt to be somewhat
more confused—but one particular body [corporea scilicet, quae tangimus,
quae videmus; non quidem corpora in communi, generales enim istae per-
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21; AT VII 31).
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metaphysicae, ed. Georg Olms (Hildesheim: Bischöfliche Pressestelle
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de l’homme: De la Renaissance à Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin, 1998), pp. 333–4.
25. Suárez writes: “I presuppose that the origin of this falsity can be discov-
ered both from a theological and philosophical point of view. In the first
case, the theologian will say that the origin of falsity and every error and
human falsity is the original sin” (DM 9.2.3). Moreover, Suárez argues
that whosoever perceives error in this way interprets original sin as the
deprivation of supernaturally engrained justice, and not as a positive
identity that attaches itself to human nature. By consequence, a theologi-
cal perspective must also address the philosophical aspect of the question,
and presume a cause of the error in the human being as such: “And this
shows how much it can be seen from a philosophical point of view, both if
it addresses an internal principle in man himself, or any external princi-
ple, that could persuade man toward error” (ibid.).
26. And Suárez continues, “Answer: of course God can compel the intellect to
move according to what is not evident: but this movement follows paths
that pass beyond and over the nature of the intellect, while now we only
speak of that which occurs according to its nature” (DM 9.2.7).
27. For example, Suárez writes, “But even conceding this miracle, the true
and correct doctrine of the theologians teaches that God cannot induce an
intellect to believe a falsehood, because this is offensive to his goodness no
less than lying. Therefore, it can never be the case that the first origin of
fallacy refers to God and that God persuades or produces falseness with
an intervention expressly designed for this purpose” (DM 9.2.7).
28. Suárez writes: “Concerning the angel, it must be stated that the angel
cannot determine, immediately, the intellect to the judgment or to a sec-
ond act, making use of its own natural power; in fact only God, who is its
author, can do this. Consequently, the malevolent angel has even less
ability to compel the intellect to assent to fallacy, but at most it can induce
a false assent with suggestive and persuasive arguments. Nevertheless,
man can always dissent or suspend his assent, if he so chooses” (DM 9.2.7).
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29. Following the theologians, in section 3 of disputation 9 entitled “Unde
oriatur difficultas veritatem assequendi,” Suárez adopts a position close to
the Aquinian solution to the problem of error, according to which it is impos-
sible to “avoid every error, even in the natural and speculative things . . .
because of the limits of our intellect and dependence on the senses” (DM
9.3.10). Concerning this matter, Faye proposes a Cartesian deviation from
Suárez’s Disputationes (see Philosophie et perfection de l’homme, pp. 304–5,
335). However, in the previous text, Suárez supports the voluntary nature
of error, moving in the direction assumed by Descartes, according to which
it is always possible to avoid error. The thesis of the voluntary nature of the
error is obviously different from the one that traces the origins of the error
to the limits of human nature. Suárez therefore juxtaposes two incompati-
ble explanations of the phenomenon of error. He often proceeds in this
manner, at times making a bold claim, at least with respect to the estab-
lished Aquinian theory, in order to later back-step in subsequent passages
and even align himself with Aquinas. For an example of this Suárezian
procedure, which should be noted accurately in order to identify its nov-
elty under the formal respect tributed to the tradition, see Marion, Sur la
théologie blanche de Descartes, pp. 70–109.
30. See Gregory, “Dio ingannatore e genio maligno,” p. 509.
31. See DM 31.12.45, which is referenced by Descartes in a letter to Mersenne
dated May 6, 1630: “So we must not say that if God did not exist neverthe-
less these truths would be true [si Deus non esset, nihilominus istae veri-
tates essent veræ]” (CSMK 24; AT I 149–50).
32. It is true that right at the beginning of the Third Meditation, Descartes
speaks of res Arithmeticas vel Geometrias [arithmetical or geometrical
entities] (CSM II 25; AT VII 35–6), which could raise the question of
whether the Platonic conception of mathematical-geometrical entities has
already been introduced in the First Meditation. But that expression,
taken on its own, is compatible with the Aquinian doctrine of abstraction.
In fact, according to Aquinas, mathematics could purposefully abstract
from singular bodies, but not from the notion of substance that is sub-
jected to quantity, which is sufficient for discussing res mathematica even
within this doctrine: “quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures
. . . can be considered apart from sensible qualities . . . but they cannot be
considered without understanding the substance which is subject to the
quantity” (ST I q.85, a1). 
33. Henri Gouhier, La pensée metaphysique de Descartes (Paris: J. Vrin,
1969), p. 118.
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